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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
not unreasonable 9 and does not violate any limitation upon the power
of the Legislature. These men consented in advance to anything
thereafter accomplished by lawful exercise of that power.
CoRPoRATIoNs-NoNcumuLATIvE DIVIDENDS.-The Wabash
Railway Company for more than three years applied its surplus
earnings to working capital and improvements. During this period
no dividends were declared on any of its three classes of stock.'
When, subsequently, the directors decided to pay a dividend to junior
stockholders, the owners of Class A stock, which was entitled to
"preferential" but "noncumulative" dividends,2 sought to restrain this
action, claiming that they must first be paid the stipulated rate for
each fiscal year in which there were moneys available for distribu-
tion. Held, for the plaintiff. Barclay v. Wabash Ry Co., 30 F.
(2d) 260 (1929).3
In the absence of bad faith, the wisdom of the directors' de-
cision to defer declaration of dividends to improving the condition
of the company cannot be questioned. 4 But, whenever there are
earnings in any fiscal year, credit accrues in favor of the non-
cumulative preferred stockholders.5 They are entitled to receive
dividends despite the fact that the profits have since assumed the form
of rails, cars and other improvements. But deficiencies (in earnings)
in one year cannot be made up from earnings in other years.6 Cumu-
lative dividends, on the contrary, must be paid regardless of the time
when earned.
CRIMES-MURDER IN FIRST DEGREE-EVIDENCE-CNFESSIONS.
-Defendants were indicted and convicted of murder in the first
degree, committed in an unsuccessful attempt to burglarize a drug
' Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319, 324 (1877) ; People v. O'Brien, 111 N. Y.
1, 52 (1888); Chicago Mil. & St. P. R. R. Co. v. Wisconsin, 238 U. S. 491,
502, 35 Sup. Ct. 869 (1915).
'Preferred stock class A, preferred stock class B, and common.
' The Certificate of Incorporation states: "The preferred stock A shall be
entitled to receive preferential dividends in each fiscal year up to the amount
of five per cent. before any dividends shall be paid upon any other stock of
this corporation, but such dividends shall be noncumulative."
Rev'g, 23 F. (2nd) 691.
"When a corporation has a surplus whether a dividend share be made,
and if made how much it shall be * * * rest in the fair and honest discretion of
the directors uncontrollable by the courts." Williams v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 93 N. Y. 162 [quot. with appr. Equitable L. Assur. Society v. Union Pac.
R. Co., 212 N. Y. 360, 373, 106 N. E. 92, L. R. A. 1915 D 1052].
'New York, etc., R. R. v. Nickols, 119 U. S. 296, 7 Sup. Ct. 209 (1886);
American Steel Foundries v. Lazear, 204 Fed. 204 (C. C. A. 1913).
6 6 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of The Law of Private Corporation, Sec. 3754
(1917) ; Elkins v. Camden and Ati. R. R. Co., 36 N. J. Eq. 233 (1882).
RECENT DECISIONS
store. Two of them gave confessions which were used upon the
trial, though they protested that they were involuntary. All were
tried together after motions for separate trials were denied. Upon
appeal from this denial and the alleged error in admitting the con-
fessions. Held, granting of separate trials is discretionary with the
trial judge and in the absence of abuse of that discretion, his decision
will not be disturbed upon review. The question of whether the
confessions were voluntary or not was properly submitted to the
jury. People v. Fisher, 249 N. Y. 419, 164 N. E. 336 (1928).
The correctness of the ruling on admissibility of confessions is
so well established that it merits little discussion. Here, as before,1
it was held that the statute governed. 2 The trial court, after a pre-
liminary hearing, may admit a confession, final decision as to its
probative value being left to the jury. The main ground for appeal
in the case rested on the denial of applications for separate trials.
At common law, persons jointly indicted could be tried jointly or
separately according to the discretion of the court. With enactment
of the Revised Statutes of 1826, this rule was changed. A defend-
ant so indicted could demand a separate trial or waive it and stand
trial with his co-defendants. In 1926 the common law was restored, 3
so that abuse of discretion is the only ground for appeal.4 The evi-
dence in this case was so overwhelming that expediency and economy
demanded a single trial. A dissenting opinion r disclaims the wis-
dom of this reasoning in view of one defendant's persistent denial
of guilt.
DAMAGES - MENTAL ANGUISH - NEGLIGENCE - TELEGRAPH
COMPANIEs.-Plaintiff's son was mortally wounded and a telegram
stating the seriousness of his condition was sent to her by his wife.
It was promptly dispatched and received at the destination office of
defendant which failed to deliver it until a time too late to permit
her reaching her son before death. Plaintiff brought action for
damages resulting from mental anguish. Held, for plaintiff. Gibbs
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 146 S. E. 209 (Sup. Ct., No. Car., 1929).
The matter of redressing mental anguish was the subject of fre-
quent consideration by common law courts It is the settled rule of
those courts that such anguish, when unaccompanied by bodily
injury is too intangible and remote to form a basis of recovery of
damages. They are allowable only where there has been bodily
injury causing physical pain and mental anguish cannot be dis-
'People v. Rogers, 192 N. Y. 331, 85 N. E. 135 (1908) ; 193 N. Y. 46, 85
N. E. 809 (1908) ; People v. Doran, 246 N. Y. 409, 159 N. E. 379 (1927).
2 Code Crim. Proc., Sec. 395.
3 Ibid. at 391.
'People ex rel. Flynn v. Woods, 218 N. Y. 124, 112 N. E. 915 (1916);
Matter of Whitman, No. 2, 225 N. Y. 21, 121 N. E. 485 (1918).
'By Lehman, J., 249 N. Y. at 428, 164 N. E. at 339.
